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Abstract— The paper investigates the mechanisms for promo-
tion of cooperation in decentralized wireless networks. The main
objective is to determine whether cooperation can emerge in
these networks in the same way it emerges in biological systems.
The approach is motivated by recent results in evolutionary
biology which suggest that cooperation can be favored by natural
selection, if a certain mechanism is at work. We are interested in
promoting cooperation based on simple rules, in contrast to most
of the approaches which enforce cooperation by using complex
algorithms and require strategic complexity of the network nodes.
We present a model of a wireless network as a graph, and
associate benefits and costs with the strategy that the network
users follow at a certain time instant (cooperation or defection).
We define fitness function based on the amount of power each
node has to transmit and allow the users to update their strategy
based on the observed change of fitness. The objective is to
demonstrate that cooperative behavior, if introduced by chance,
can persists over time in the wireless network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication has two fundamental properties.
The first one is that the receive power decays exponentially as
a function of the distance between the users, which puts stress
on the power consumption; the second one is the broadcast
nature of wireless communication, which leads to interference
between the users. With the increase in the number of sub-
scribers and growth in data traffic in wireless networks, these
two features gain on importance and have a strong adverse
effect on the network performance in terms of throughput and
energy consumption.
The study of the fundamental limits of communication
networks suggests that cooperation among the users in wireless
networks could potentially overcome these effects. In this
context, techniques such as cooperative diversity [1], [2] and
interference alignment [3] have been proposed.
However, the performance analysis of wireless networks is
often based on simplifying assumptions. As a general rule,
the cost of establishing cooperation in wireless networks is
not properly taken into account when deriving the performance
limits of different cooperative schemes. Indeed, it may happen
that the benefits of cooperation are overshadowed by the cost
of establishing cooperation at first place. Additionally, very
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often a central infrastructure/control is assumed, which is not
always the case.
Having in mind the potential of cooperation, one of the main
questions to be solved is how cooperation can be established
in the network. This question is of particular importance in
networks which are largely decentralized, i.e. lack a central
infrastructure, such as mobile ad-hoc networks. As cooperation
comes at a cost for the network users, in a network which lacks
centralized control, some users may decide not to cooperate.
Cooperation in decentralized networks is usually established
by complex algorithms [7], [8] which usually promote/enforce
cooperation based on reputation tables about the users be-
havior. In contrast to the present approaches which rely on
complex algorithms in order to enforce cooperation, we are
interested in cooperation which emerges as a result of the
system evolution. This approach is inspired by recent results
in evolutionary biology which suggest that cooperation plays
an important role in evolving systems. Additionally, some of
the key results in evolutionary biology show that cooperation
can also be favored by natural selection, if certain mechanism
is at work [5], [6]. By drawing an analogy between evolving
biological systems and wireless networks we will try to iden-
tify the mechanisms which are able to promote cooperation
in decentralized wireless networks, in the way cooperation is
established in the biological systems.
II. COOPERATION IN BIOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
Recent results in biology [4]–[6] show that cooperation has
played a fundamental role in many of the major transitions
in biological evolution and is essential to the functioning
of a large number of biological systems. Observations show
that cooperative interactions are required for many levels of
biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of
animals. Human society, as well, is based to a large extent
on mechanisms that promote cooperation. In the following we
will shortly address the concept of cooperation in biology and
revisit the candidate mechanisms which explain the emergence
and stability of cooperation.
A. Emergence of cooperation
It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural
selection favors defectors over cooperators. There is much
current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in
structured populations and on graphs [5]. In [5] the authors
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different graphs, including cycles, spatial lattices, random
regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks. The
conclusion is that natural selection favors cooperation, if
the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c,
exceeds the average number of neighbors, k, b/c > k. The
intuition behind is that in this case cooperation can evolve
as a consequence of social viscosity even in the absence of
reputation effects or strategic complexity.
B. Mechanisms which explain the emergence of cooperation
Candidate mechanisms in biology which are able to explain
the emergence and stability of cooperation are kin selection,
direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and
group selection [6].
Among the candidate mechanisms which promote coopera-
tion based on natural selection, we identify network reciprocity
as the most relevant for wireless communication networks.
Network reciprocity explains the emergence of cooperation
in a population which is not well mixed. The approach
of capturing this effect is evolutionary graph theory, which
allows the study of how spatial structure affects evolutionary
dynamics.
The argument for natural selection of defection is based on
a well-mixed population, where everybody interacts equally
likely with everybody else [5]. This approximation is used by
all standard approaches to evolutionary game dynamics. But
real populations are not well mixed. One approach of capturing
this effect is evolutionary graph theory. According to this
model, the individuals of a population occupy the vertices of
a graph, where the edges determine who interacts with whom.
Additionally, the users are assumed to be plain cooperators
and defectors without any strategic complexity. In this setting,
the experiments show that cooperators can prevail by forming
network clusters, where they help each other. The resulting
network reciprocity is a generalization of spatial reciprocity
[6].
III. EMERGENCE OF COOPERATION IN WIRELESS
NETWORKS
Some theoretical approaches to the evolution of cooperation
in biological systems are based on reciprocal altruism and
on the iterated Prisoner’s dilemma [4], which assume that
individuals can adopt complex strategies that take into account
the history of their interactions with other individuals. How-
ever, many of the most fundamental instances of cooperation
in biological systems involve simple entities for which such
assumptions are not realistic.
Similarly, we will also be interested in defining simple
rules which can promote cooperation in wireless networks.
This is in contrast to most of the present approaches which
rely on complex algorithms and reputation tables in order
to enforce cooperation in the network. Our objective is to
promote cooperation by relying on simple strategies, i.e. by
imposing a limited set of rules which mimic the principles of
evolution, and let the systems evolve in time.
The question we ask is the following? Can cooperation arise
in communication networks by evolution? If yes, which mech-
anism should be at work? It seems that network reciprocity
is a promising candidate for promotion of cooperation in
communication networks. Indeed, when wireless networks are
described as graphs, an analogy can be drawn with populations
which are not well mixed. The reason for this is that, given
a power constraint, one user can interact only with the nodes
which are in the range of his transmission, forming a cluster
of potential cooperators.
In order to investigate the effects of the application of this
kind of mechanism to wireless communication networks, we
define a relatively simple network model which, however,
captures both the essence of wireless communication networks
and the graph models used in evolutionary game theory.
We simulate the emergence of cooperative behavior in a
communication network in order to explore whether rules such
as natural selection can favor cooperation in these networks.
A. Network model
We model the network as a graph where the users represent
the nodes and the edges are related to interactions between
the nodes. The objective of each network node is to be power
efficient, i.e to minimize the amount of power it spends for
packet transmission. As in game theory, we assume two types
of nodes, cooperators and defectors. Additionally, we make
the following assumptions. First, we assume that the power
decays exponentially as a function of the distance to the
transmitter (source). Hence, if the transmit power is PT , the
power received at distance d from the transmitter is
PR = C
PT
dα
, (1)
where α depends on the propagation characteristics of the area
(urban, suburban, rural, etc.). Typically, α takes values in the
range 2 ≤ α ≤ 4.
We divide the time scale in time slots of equal duration and
assume that the users are active in one time slot (have message
to send) with probability a. We take the symmetric scenario
where each user is equally likely to send data to any of the
other users. Under these assumptions, we will be essentially
interested in the total power consumed by the network over
time.
Let us say that at one time slot user A needs to transmit
to user B and that the power it uses for direct transmission is
PD. As result of the propagation effects, the received power
at user B is PR = C PDdαAB . We define the signal-to-noise ratio
at the receiver as SNR = PR/σ2, where where σ2 is the
noise variance. We say that the transmission is successful
if the signal-to-noise ratio at the receiver defined exceeds
a certain threshold, SNR ≥ SNR0 = PR0/σ2, which is
required for reliable reception. In other words, in order to
have a successful transmission, the node A should transmit
with power PD ≥ dαABPR0 . In the first instant, for simplicity,
we assume perfect power adaptation (which should be justified
in general) and assume that the node A adjusts the transmit
power to the distance dAB , such that it meets the receive
SNR requirement exactly. This is, of course, a simplification,
3since for this adaptation to work, A should know the network
topology (the distance to B, dAB) or, at least, to have a
feedback from B about the receive SNR such that it can adjust
the transmit power PD.
We say that a node C is in range of or connected to A if
it can ”hear” A’ transmission to B. Under the assumed power
adaptation, a node C is in the range of A if dAR ≤ dAB . We
also call this node an intermediate node. In the time period
that node A transmits data to node B, there is a certain number
of nodes which may be in the range of A. The connections are
represented as edges in the graph. We note that this means that
each transmission from A to B is associated with one directed
network graph. Since in real networks there exist simultaneous
transmissions between different pairs of users, at each time
slot the networks is actually described by a set of different
directed graphs, rather then a single graph. Depending on the
users activity, the set of graphs also changes over time.
Node A 
Node B 
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Fig. 1. An intermediate node C helps the transmission from A to B.
Now, if the intermediate node C decides to help A in the
transmission, i.e to cooperate, it will retransmit the signal
received from A and retransmit it to B, with power PC . Again,
this power is chosen such that the power received at B is
exactly the minimal one required for successful transmission,
PR0 . Thus, the cost of the cooperation is the retransmission
power, c = PC . The benefit that the node A obtains from the
cooperative act of C is that, in the presence of the cooperator
C, A can decrease the transmit power to a value lower then
the power required for direct transmission, PI ≤ PD, where
the subscript I stands for indirect transmission (transmission
when cooperators are involved). In this context, we can define
the benefit of the cooperative act as b = PD − PI .
Now, let us say that A is connected to k nodes, out of which
i ≤ k help A in the transmission, i.e. cooperate. Having more
then one cooperator, i ≥ 1, produces the effect of cooperative
diversity, well known in cooperative relaying [1], [2]. Namely,
when i different cooperators retransmit the signal received
from A, B receives i copies of the signal at the same time
yielding an average receive power of iPR. If we look the other
way around, the cooperators can now share the retransmission
power PC and still yield the same SNR at user B, as a single
cooperator would do by using a retransmission power PC .
Obviously, having more cooperators helping the transmission
decreases the cost of cooperation for a single cooperator.
Let us now change the perspective and look at the network
at time slot n from the viewpoint of a single node (user), let
us say node C for example. For the node C we distinguish
between incoming and outgoing edges. The outgoing edges
are associated with the nodes which are in the range of C,
when C transmits its’ own packets (to user D for example).
Node C 
Fig. 2. Ingoing and outgoing edges for node C.
On the other hand, if the node C is in the range of one node,
let us say A for example, then there is an incoming edge to
C, outgoing from A. We note that by adapting this model, we
allow that at one time slot the node C can be in the range
of several other nodes and also help several of them in the
transmission. In reality this can be done by performing a kind
of multiplexing at the nodes, for example by using spread-
spectrum sequences to distinguish between the different users.
Now, we can define a fitness function for the node C which
is associated with the power it spends over time. Let us take
that the number of incoming edges is l, out of which j ≤ l
are active (associated with ongoing transmissions). Also, let
us take that the number of outgoing edges is k, out of which
i ≤ k are active (associated with cooperators). According to
this model, the total power that C spends for cooperation, PC ,
is a function of j, PI = PI(j). On the other hand, the power
that C spends for its own transmission is either PI or PD.
We can now define the change of the fitness of the network
node C at time slot n as
∆f(n) = −α [βPI + (1− β)PD]− γδPC(j) (2)
where α, β, γ, δ ∈ 0, 1 are parameters which indicate packet
transmission and presence of cooperators and defectors. In
particular, α = 1 when C has a packet to transmit; β = 1
when C has at least one cooperator as a neighbor; γ = 1
when C is connected to at least one active node at that time
instant; and δ = 1 corresponds to C being a cooperator.
At first sight, the benefit of cooperation is not obvious.
However, one can see that, according to this model, when
cooperators are present in the networks, both PI and PC
decrease.
Since a certain user has data to transmit with a certain
probability, we need to work over more time slots when
calculating the change in the fitness. We therefore update the
4strategy at the end of a session of length Ns time slots. The
change in the fitness of C at the end of the session is:
∆F =
Ns∑
n=1
∆f(n) (3)
B. Simulations
Since the model is complex to be analyzed analytically, we
perform simulations in order the track the cooperative behavior
over time. We take initially a 300m x 300m square grid, with
30 nodes distributed randomly in the grid area.
The fitness of the individual nodes is averaged over time
blocks of length 20 (one iteration). At the end of the it-
eration the individual nodes update their strategy based on
their individual fitness, in the following way. If the fitness
has not changed in the previous block (for example if the
node has not been active), the strategy remains unchanged.
If the fitness of the individual node has increased compared
to the previous iteration, the node becomes cooperator (if
previously was defector) or remains cooperator otherwise.
Similarly, a cooperator becomes/remains defector when the
fitness decreases.
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Fig. 3. Number of cooperators in the network over time.
The initial observations show an oscillatory behavior in
the network, as shown in Fig. 3, where a single cooperator
introduced in the network by chance (mutation), leads to
clusters of cooperators which develop and diminish over time.
The conclusion from the experiment is that, once introduced
by chance, cooperative behavior can persist over time with
high probability.
Fig. 4 illustrates the average fitness in the network. We
observe an increasing trend of the average fitness in the
network, as the users update their strategy. We should note
that the instantaneous fitness is related to the power spent
for transmission at the moment in time, and is affected by
the randomness of the users’transmissions. Additionally, the
strategy adaptation is simple and is performed based only on
the comparison with the previous session (time block), and
not over longer periods of time. These are the main reasons
for the oscillatory behavior of the fitness function over time.
Fig. 5 shows the average network power, which is directly
related to the average fitness (absolute value). As expected, as
the individual users update their strategies over time based on
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Fig. 4. Average fitness in the network over time.
the fitness, the total network consumption shows a decreasing
trend.
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Fig. 5. Average network power.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We investigate the mechanisms for promotion of cooper-
ation in decentralized wireless networks. The approach is
motivated by recent results in evolutionary biology which
suggest that cooperation can be favored by natural selection,
if a certain mechanism is at work. The wireless network is
modelled as a graph, where benefits and costs are associated
with the strategy that the network users follow at a certain time
instant (cooperation or defection). We define a fitness function
for the individual modes which is based on the amount of
power each node has to transmit. The simulation results
demonstrate that in the particular network model, cooperative
behavior, once introduced by chance, can persist over time
with high probability. As a future work, the results will be
extended to different network models and under different
traffic loads.
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